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ABSTRACT: G. F. Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human pur-
posive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theo-
retical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through 
self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an 
infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are 
theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experi-
ence. As a consequence, it is conceivable that direct introspection of an event as 
a purposive action may be mistaken. I indicate ways in which the eliminativist 
may be able to explain why our perception and introspection is afflicted with 
systematic error.
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A scientific theory will often explain a range of observational facts by 
positing a set of theoretical entities of specific types, such as electrons. 
The theoretical entities are known, or assumed, to exist only because they 
are part of the successful explanation. If someone proposes an alternative 
theory, which posits a different set of theoretical entities (for example, 
oxygen instead of phlogiston), and this alternative theory better explains 
the same set of observational facts, and perhaps explains some other facts 
besides, the theoretical entities that belonged to the first theory may be 
jettisoned along with that theory.
We have a similar situation with regard to the teleological explanation 
of human action. The same set of physicalistically described behavioural 
facts may be explained by rival theories which posit different purposes of 
the agents. For example, the same physical behaviour could be explained 
in the following two ways. The first explanation says that there are two 
groups of students, each dressed in colourful costumes, performing the 
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following ritual in a cow pasture. Each group has a short meeting to dis-
cuss and vote on some topic, and then the individuals selected to present 
the conclusions of their group line up facing the other group. After a brief 
moment of silence, one person on each side yells out its opinion and then 
a fight breaks out which has to be broken up by people in striped shirts. 
Then the whole thing is repeated. The second explanation is that the stu-
dents are playing American football. The two explanations might explain 
what happens on the field equally well; but the second explanation will 
also explain some things that the first does not, such as what the students 
later say about what they were doing. The purposes attributed to the stu-
dents in the first explanation might then be rejected.
In the case of human purposive behaviour, however, it has been sug-
gested that it may be possible to explain the physicalistically described be-
haviour in terms of underlying neurophysiological mechanisms, without 
referring to purposes at all. If this provides a better explanation than avail-
able purposive explanations, then we can entirely avoid the attribution of 
purposes to human agents, and we may dismiss human purposes as being 
as illusory as phlogiston. Proponents of this suggestion are “eliminativ-
ists” with regard to human purposes: they affirm that there are no human 
purposes; that, as a matter of fact, the concept of purposive action is unin-
stantiated in human beings. In a recent paper, Schueler (2009: section 6) 
offers two complementary arguments which are intended to show that this 
eliminativist affirmation is false because human purposive action cannot 
be an illusion.
In the first argument, Schueler makes a distinction between theoreti-
cal explanations and the underlying facts that they explain. The former 
involve theoretical concepts, such as those of an electron, oxygen or phlo-
giston. These are concepts that apply to the underlying facts in the sense 
that they explain them; but they are also based on these underlying facts 
in the sense that they are known to be instantiated only because of their 
place in successful explanations. The concept of purpose, however, is not 
a theoretical concept. While it is similar to a theoretical concept in that it 
applies to the observational facts about behaviour that can be explained 
by its means, it is not based on these underlying facts. For, we know of the 
existence of purposes independently of the success of any explanations 
in which the concept of purpose plays a part. Excluding unusual circum-
stances, such as self-deception, when I act for a purpose, I do not learn 
what my purpose is by formulating a hypothesis about my purpose and 
testing it against observations of myself. To use Schueler’s example, when 
I know that my purpose in running down the street is to get away from 
some bad guys, it is not because I somehow observe myself internally and 
then on some grounds attribute that purpose to myself, more or less in the 
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same way someone else who is observing or thinking about me might do. 
Rather, I am directly aware of what my purpose is. Acting with some pur-
pose is itself a state of an agent, frequently perfectly conscious. Since we 
have direct awareness of (some of) our purposes, no neurophysiological 
advances can show these purposes to be illusory.
In the second argument, Schueler says that, in a normal case in which 
an agent acts with a purpose, the agent knows what that purpose is. Now, 
suppose that the concept of purpose is a theoretical concept. Then agents 
would know what their purposes are only by figuring them out. However, 
figuring out the purpose of an action is itself a purposive activity; and 
when an agent figures something out, they typically know that their pur-
pose is to figure something out. But, then, to know that their purpose is to 
figure something out, the agent would have to have figured that out; that 
is, the agent would have to have completed another purposeful activity of 
figuring out, the purpose of which the agent will typically know; and so 
on ad infinitum. Thus, each normal case of acting with a purpose would 
be possible only if the agent carried out an infinity of purposeful activities, 
which is impossible for human beings, who have finite capacities. There-
fore, the supposition, that the concept of purpose is a theoretical concept, 
is false. The concept of purpose must, then, be one that we can know to 
apply to our actions directly. In consequence, no neurophysiological ad-
vances can show that our purposes are illusory.
It seems to me that each of these arguments is unsound. The funda-
mental problem with each is that it depends upon a misconstrual of non-
theoretical concepts. For, Schueler’s distinction between theoretical and 
other concepts ignores a sense in which all our concepts are theoretical. 
In this sense, a concept is theoretical if we can be mistaken in applying 
it to our experience. If the concept of purpose is theoretical in this sense, 
the fact that it is not a theoretical concept in Schueler’s sense presents no 
problem for the eliminativist.
It is a commonplace of the philosophy of science that even obser-
vational concepts are theory-laden and that observation statements are 
consequently fallible (Watkins 1984: 82–84, 247–78). All our perceptions 
are informed, or misinformed, by theories: the content of our perception 
(what we see something as) depends upon the theories we utilise in the ob-
servation. Two people who utilise different theories may see the very same 
thing very differently. For example, what a layman sees as an oscillating 
iron bar, with a mirror attached, sending a beam of light to a celluloid 
ruler, a physicist sees as the electrical resistance of a coil (Duhem 1954: 
145). What someone unfamiliar with playing cards sees as a piece of white 
card with a colourful pattern on it, the rest of us see as a four of hearts. But 
the theories which inform our observations may be false. This is perhaps 
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obvious in the case of the physicist; but it is true also in more homely 
cases like that of the four of hearts. In psychological experiments, subjects 
who were briefly shown anomalous playing cards, such as a black four of 
hearts, reported having seen their normal counterparts (a red four of hearts 
or a black four of spades): it took repeated exposures for them to notice 
that the anomalous cards did not look right and, eventually, to describe 
them correctly (Kuhn 1970: 62–64). Their misperceptions were informed 
by a false theory, or expectation, to the effect that playing cards come in 
standard designs which exclude there being a black four of hearts.
Schueler might concede this point but object that all such cases con-
cern observations that are informed by concepts that have been invented 
by us. Thus, while the physicist directly perceives something as electrical 
resistance, this is possible for him only because he has mastered a set of 
explanatory scientific theories which posit the existence of such a thing. 
If he later rejects some of these theories as false, he might, with some 
practice, be able to return to seeing things in the way that the layman sees 
them. Similarly, when we perceive something as a four of hearts, this is 
possible for us only because we have mastered a theory about playing 
cards which posits the existence of such entities. It is more difficult to 
imagine that we could all be mistaken about the existence of such a thing 
as a four of hearts (a whole practice of card-playing would have to be 
some kind of illusion) or that we could cease to see a four of hearts as a 
four of hearts; but both are at least conceivable. Schueler might continue 
that the same applies to eliminativist examples of concepts that have been 
shown to be mistaken by the progress of our knowledge (P. M. Churchland 
1981: 78–82, 89–90; 1988: 43–45; P.S. Churchland 1986: 280–82; Rorty 
1965, 1970). This is plainly so with respect to scientific examples such as 
the ether, celestial spheres, animal spirits, impetus, caloric and phlogis-
ton. But it seems also to be the case with regard to other examples. Thus, 
the medievals saw mental disturbance as demonic possession, and some 
tribal people perceive thunder as godly anger. But, Schueler might con-
tend, such mistaken perception-as is possible only where perceivers have 
acquired theories involving invented concepts, where the only reason to 
accept the existence of things instantiating the concepts is the explanatory 
success (real or imagined) of the theories that contain them.
The flaw in this objection is that even concepts that are not invented 
as part of explanatory theories, which are thus not theoretical in Schueler’s 
sense, are still theoretical in the sense that we can be mistaken in applying 
them directly in our perception. All of our ordinary observational concepts 
impute to their instances a typical nature (features, relations or behaviour) 
which transcends the content of any finite set of observations (Popper 
2002: 76, 440–46), though this typical nature may be indicated in an in-
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determinate way (Kuhn 1977: 301–19). Thus, each of these concepts is an 
implicit theory.1 Assume that we have identified some concepts of observ-
able things, such as rocks, trees and water, which are utilised by unedu-
cated people and have not been invented for explanatory purposes (thus, 
they are not theoretical concepts in Schueler’s sense). Even so, some of 
these people who perceive something as a rock may be inclined to change 
their minds if, when they reach out to touch the thing, their hands pass 
through it. Some who perceive something as a tree will probably accept 
that they are mistaken if they see the thing waddle off. Similarly, people 
who say that a particular liquid is water because it looks, smells and tastes 
like water will probably change their minds if the liquid starts to burn a 
hole in their tongues.
The same seems to hold for the concept of purposive action. We did 
not have to figure out that other humans are purposive agents. We natu-
rally perceive other humans as purposive: even one-and-a-half-year-old 
children make conjectures about other people’s goals (Pinker 2002: 31–
40, 55, 60–63). But we can misperceive another’s goals, as when I see a 
woman as waving to me when she is in fact shooing away a bug, or when 
I perceive an unintentional action as intentional. We can perceive behav-
iour that is not even an action, such as a reflex, as purposive. We could 
conceivably perceive a robot as a purposive agent too. Indeed, young chil-
dren, and also some people in tribal cultures, experience the world in an 
animistic way, directly perceiving inanimate things as purposive agents 
(P. M. Churchland 1981: 74; Piaget 1929: 169–251). The fact that some 
behaviour of other people is perceived by us as purposive directly, without 
the intervention of concepts we have invented to explain their behaviour, 
is consistent with that behaviour not being purposive.
Of course, each of us naturally conceives of ourselves as a purposive 
agent and much of our behaviour appears to ourselves in introspection 
as purposive. But why could it not be the case that we are mistaken here 
too? We know we can be mistaken in introspection. For example, peo-
ple make mistakes about the reasons for, or the influences on, their own 
thoughts and actions, often being misguided by a priori theories they hold 
(Nisbett & Wilson 1977); and philosophers disagree about the phenom-
enology of thought (Schwitzgebel 2008: 257–59). So, it seems arbitrary 
to maintain that in the case of introspection of our own purposive action 
we cannot be mistaken. Indeed, Schueler admits cases of self-deception 
in which, through introspection, we misidentify the purpose of our action. 
1 This is not to affirm that these concepts are implicitly defined by the theories in 
which they figure. For cogent criticism of that account of theoretical concepts see Feyer-
abend (1981a), Kuhn (1977) and Popper (2002: 51–54).
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Why could we not also be mistaken in thinking that an action of ours is 
purposive at all? Schueler does not give us an answer.
It might be objected that it is difficult to see how we could be mistaken 
about such a thing. However, the difficulty of conceptualising ourselves 
and our own actions as non-purposive is the difficulty of abandoning an 
ingrained conceptual scheme for a new and conflicting one. Such difficul-
ties can be overcome, as happened, for example, when Newtonian physics 
supplanted Aristotelian physics or when Newtonian theory was in turn 
supplanted by relativity theory. It might be admitted that it is conceivable 
that we are mistaken in attributing purposes to our actions, but objected 
that it seems highly unlikely that it should really be so. However, in 1846, 
when Newton’s theory had yielded the successful prediction of the exist-
ence of Neptune, it seemed highly unlikely that Newton’s theory could be 
mistaken. It might be objected that, in previous scientific revolutions, the 
transition from one conceptual scheme to another was aided by the ex-
planatory successes of theories that used the new scheme, whereas we do 
not yet seem to have any examples of successful explanations of human 
action which show that people who took themselves to be acting purpo-
sively were actually not acting purposively at all. However, the elimina-
tivist will say (Feyerabend 1981b: 165–66) that the research programme 
of eliminative materialism is at too early a stage to expect such examples, 
but that such examples will be forthcoming as and when the programme is 
successfully developed. It is at least conceivable that this will happen.
Indeed, some philosophers who are incompatibilists about free will 
can already understand how we may be mistaken about attributing pur-
posive actions to other people and to ourselves, at least if they admit that 
determinism may be true. For, some philosophers maintain that, if deter-
minism is true, not only do we never act freely, but we never act at all. 
Thus, Alvarez (2009) and Steward (2008, 2009) argue that agency is es-
sentially a two-way power, involving the ability either to do or to refrain, 
in which case a causally determined event cannot be an action. If this is 
right and if it is also possible that determinism is true, then it is possible 
that none of us are purposive agents. We can arrive at the same conclusion 
from a slightly different angle. For, if an action is fully determined by a 
sequence of causes beginning before the agent was born, then it is not up 
to the agent what action is being done or whether it is being done, in which 
case, it seems, the agent can hardly be doing it intentionally. But if an ac-
tion is not intentional, it is not done with a purpose. So, if determinism is 
true, there are no purposive actions. Since it seems possible that determin-
ism is true, it could be the case that each of our introspections of purposive 
action is mistaken. However, these sorts of arguments, though convincing 
to some (including this author), are of limited force, since they may have 
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little appeal to compatibilists about free will, or even to incompatibilists 
who think that determinism is impossible.
If we do eventually discover that when we perceive others as acting 
with a purpose, and when we introspect our own activity as purposeful, we 
are misperceiving behaviour that is in fact purely mechanical, we should 
then modify our conceptual scheme, perhaps jettisoning the concept of 
purpose entirely, at least in theoretical discussions. Perhaps people who 
master the new neurophysiological theory of human action could come to 
perceive their own actions and those of other people as purely mechanical 
events, just as the physicist sees the electrical resistance of a coil. How-
ever, it seems more likely that we would be unable to stop seeing human 
behaviour, either that of other people or our own, as purposive actions, 
even though we think we know better (Strawson 1974, 11–13, 18–19). If 
that were so, we could still, when we are engaged in theoretical discus-
sion, acknowledge the error in our perceptions. This would be parallel to 
what we do in the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion: even though we know 
the two lines are of equal length, we cannot help seeing them as of differ-
ent lengths; but we discount this as mere seeming.
It might be objected that the eliminativist owes us an explanation for 
why we take our own behaviour, and that of other people, to be purpo-
sive, that is, an explanation for why we have the concept of purpose and 
are naturally inclined to apply it directly in our introspections and in our 
observations of others. In response, the eliminativist might say, in a way 
familiar from evolutionary psychology, that our perception of things in 
that way enables us to develop theories about human behaviour which 
are simple and which, though false, yield roughly accurate predictions 
for the sorts of situations we are likely to encounter. There might then be 
an evolutionary advantage to us having such concepts and the propensity 
to develop such theories, rather than true theories which may be far more 
complex. For the losses in accuracy of prediction may be only marginal 
for the bulk of our everyday circumstances, while the resources saved by 
not building greater brain power may be large and may produce substan-
tial benefits if used in other ways, for example, to build stronger arms and 
legs. In short, our survival and reproduction may be enhanced because we 
have a simple conceptual scheme which is systematically misleading in at 
least some respects.
Anyone who doubts whether a false theory could be useful in ne-
gotiating our way in the world should recall that, even though relativity 
theory has superseded Newton’s theory, and the latter is false if relativity 
theory is true, scientists at NASA use Newton’s theory, rather than relativ-
ity theory, to plan their space explorations because it gives results which 
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are accurate enough for practical purposes while being much simpler to 
use than relativity theory.
An alternative, or complementary, form of explanation of our em-
ploying the concept of human purpose could refer to the evolutionary 
advantages of the bonding and social organisation that are possible if 
creatures appear to themselves and to each other to be purposive, even if 
they are not. This explanation would naturally be linked to an eliminativ-
ist explanation of morality. Moral concepts are observational, rather than 
theoretical in Schueler’s sense (McNaughton 1988: 55–57). For instance, 
if we see a man punch an innocent bystander, we directly perceive his 
action as wrong. Of course, as with all observational concepts, we can be 
mistaken in the direct application of moral concepts in our perception. For 
example, if we learn that the two men were actually stunt men rehearsing 
a fight scene and no blow was struck, we may concede that we did not 
perceive a wrong action. But it is also conceivable that moral concepts 
have no instances at all, as error theorists maintain (Mackie 1977: chapter 
1). An explanation for why we are prone to this systematic mistake may be 
offered in terms of the evolutionary advantages of the co-operative behav-
iour that is possible and likely if creatures take their actions to have moral 
qualities (Pinker 2002: 53, 168–69, 242–44). In a somewhat similar way it 
has been proposed that humans have evolved to employ a concept of God, 
not because it is instantiated (it might or might not be), but because it gen-
erates emotions and attitudes that aid survival and reproduction (Hamer 
2004). Of course, all such evolutionary explanations need working out 
in detail, and unexpected problems with them might emerge when this is 
attempted.
Thus, eliminativists who think that human purposes, and purposive 
actions, will eventually be shown to be illusory by the progress of science 
can concede the claims made in Schueler’s arguments while denying their 
ultimate conclusion. With regard to the first argument, they could (and, 
I think, should) concede that the concept of purpose is not theoretical in 
Schueler’s sense. It is, rather, an element of a conceptual scheme that is 
part of our biological inheritance, so that our own behaviour (and that of 
other people) usually appears to us directly as purposive. But eliminativ-
ists will maintain that we may eventually discover that this appearance is 
deceptive, that human behaviour does not instantiate the concept of pur-
posive action. If they are right, then what we take to be our everyday 
knowledge of our own purposes is either not knowledge at all, or is fallible 
knowledge, that is, useful falsehood that we might eventually discover to 
be false and which we might even be able to replace with something more 
serviceable. With regard to the second argument, they could (and, I think, 
should) concede that, since the concept of purpose is not a theoretical 
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concept in Schueler’s sense, we did not invent the concept for explana-
tory purposes and we do not normally figure out what our own purposes 
are. But they will maintain that the concept of purpose is theoretical in the 
sense that our direct application of it is fallible and that it might even have 
no instances at all. It is therefore conceivable that future advances in our 
knowledge will show human purpose to be illusory.
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